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Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform
Daniel Richman*
Deciding how much time a person should spend in prison for a serious
crime is an inherently moral and political act. And it is certainly coldhearted and philosophically problematic to view sentencing as just an agency
problem with criminal defendants as objects of a system in which prison
terms are simply outputs.' So I will not even try to justify resorting to a narrow institutional perspective as a normative matter. But, for better or worse,
those political actors with the greatest influence on sentencing regimes have
to think in aggregate terms. While there is considerable normative appeal to
the idea of courtroom actors, and particularly judges, crafting an individualized sentence for each defendant, we need also to recognize that for elected
officials at the top of the prosecutorial hierarchy, sentencing-particularly
sentencing after a negotiated guilty plea-presents just another iteration of
the classic problem of administrative law: how to limit the ability of agents to
take advantage of informational asymmetries to slack off or import their own
policy preferences.2
One need hardly embrace the policy preferences of elected executive
officials or the policy process to see the virtues of considering this internal
perspective. The first is simply a matter of advocacy: However convinced
one is that sentences are too high or that sentencing policy should be the exclusive province of judges, these are not likely to be effective starting points
for conversations with sentencing hierarchs who can promote their
sentencing preferences only by restricting the authority of line actors. And
these sentencing hierarchs dominate the policymaking and legislative
process. Budgetary considerations, at least at the state level, may lead
statewide officials to reconsider levels of incarceration, but within these
Professor of Law & Brendan Moore Chair in Advocacy, Fordham Law School.
Thanks to
Richard Boylan, John Pfaff, Bill Stuntz, Ian Weinstein, Ron Wright, and the attendees at the Texas
Law Review Punishment Law andPolicy symposium for extremely helpful comments. Thanks also
to Susan Klein, Jordan Steiker, and the Texas Law Review for inviting me to participate in the
symposium and for being such generous hosts.
1. See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV.
37, 38 (2005) (comparing sentencing systems and policies to "machines").
2. See David Markell, "Slack" in the Administrative State and Its Implicationsfor Governance:
The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (examining agency behavior in the
administrative enforcement of environmental law); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of
Organization,28 AM. J.POL. SCI. 739, 763 (1984) (discussing the ability of bureaucratic superiors

to control their subordinates); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and lts
Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1299, 1300 (1997) (stating that "discretion... is simply an alternative and rather mystifying
way to refer to ordinary bureaucratic processes of supervision and policymaking"); Susan P.
Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 ANN. REV. Soc. 263, 264 (2005) (noting that information asymmetries
cloud principals' awareness of agent actions).
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constraints, they will still have enforcement priorities. The second is a
matter of accountability and transparency. Legislators, elected officials, and
political appointees may be all too prone to go overboard in getting "tough
on crime," but our general expectation (at least outside the criminal justice
area) that unregulated agents are prone to drift or shirk should not be relaxed.
Perhaps there is some optimal amount of drifting or shirking that will compensate for the failure of the political process to appropriately calibrate its3
response to crime. But even as one recognizes the value of "working group"
justice-the justice meted out within the courtroom triad of prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge--one can still find some countervailing value in the
efforts of politically accountable officials to maintain a degree of control
over the compromises reached by their unelected minions in the low-visibility world of plea bargaining.
Yet how do these officials exercise such control? And what effects will
the successful exercise of such control have on the rest of the system? These
are the questions considered here (but hardly resolved) in an effort to start
exploring how the internal prosecutorial monitoring project conflicts with or
reinforces particular sentencing regimes. As a descriptive matter, this is a
technical inquiry into the mechanics of institutional coordination and an attempt to add to the literature that, when it does consider the politics of
sentencing, tends to treat prosecutorial interests as monolithic.4 Treatments
of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing context also tend to focus on its
challenge to horizontal equity and judicial discretion within sentencing
regimes.5 The goal here is to reverse the arrow and, using an internal
executive perspective, to start looking at how sentencing regimes and judicial
enforcement of those regimes can be used as tools for the hierarchical control
of line prosecutors in the plea bargaining process. To be sure, measures that
promote hierarchical control will also promote horizontal equity. Indeed, the
two goals have much in common. But the focus here, and perhaps in certain
policymaking circles, will be on control.
First, we will consider a problem arising out of ostensibly successful
regulation within a local prosecutor's office. Then we will consider issues
relating to regulation from outside the office to see how judicial supervision
of plea bargaining through factually intensive sentencing inquiries can reflect
3. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT
courtroom as a "workgroup").

JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE 20 (1977) (describing the

4. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) (analyzing the effects of the sentencing reform
movement and determining that rather than restricting discretion, it had "transferred discretion from
judges to prosecutors," referring to prosecutors as a single entity); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering
Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 722 (2005) (stating that "[pjrosecutors form the classic enforcement

agency" in an analysis of those agencies charged with regulating the sentencing of crime, treating
the prosecutors as one cohesive unit in a traditional agency model).
5. See, e.g.. Stephanos Bibas. Regulating Local Variations in FederalSentencing, 58 STAN. L.

REV. 137, 138 (2005) (discussing the tension between horizontal equity in sentencing and local
prosecutorial discretion).
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(and perhaps occur because of) the interest of a statewide or national centralized prosecutorial authority in controlling its own minions. Finally, we
consider how the decentralization of authority in a local office can give the
chief prosecutor of that office a perspective much like that of a statewide
official.
I.

Internal Management and the Pitfalls of Unilateral Reform

We start with a story that, at first blush, seems to be one in which
shirking by line actors is successfully and unilaterally attacked by their
politically accountable superior. On further analysis, however, it ends up
looking much more like a case study in institutional disarray.
In their fascinating 2002 Stanford Law Review article, Ron Wright and
Marc Miller presented and assessed the efforts of New Orleans District
Attorney Harry Connick to take on a system in which, he claimed, "lazy"
prosecutors were using the plea-bargaining process to "'move' cases and
avoid trial."6 Connick "instructed his prosecutors not to engage in plea
bargaining-particularly charge bargaining-except under very limited
circumstances. 7 What interested Wright and Miller, however, was that
Connick coupled this promulgation with a move calculated to reduce the
incentives that drive deeply discounted plea offers: a significant commitment
of resources to the screening of cases presented by the police for
prosecution. 8
Attorneys in the screening unit-some of the most experienced in the
office-would review each investigative file from the police, speak to all the
key witnesses and victims, and generally assess the strength of the case. 9
Office policy then required them-if they decided to go forward-to charge
the most serious crimes that the facts would support at trial. 10 And office
policy made it extraordinarily difficult for the assistants handling the case
thereafter to retreat from the charges thus specified."
The result, as
intended, was that the office declined a relatively high number of cases-a
fact it blamed on poor police work-and that bargaining played an extraordinarily limited role in the disposition of cases that it did pursue.' 2 Wright and
Miller thus found that "[t]he data mostly support... Connick's claims to
have implemented a screening/bargaining tradeoff over the last thirty

6. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61
(2002).
7. Id. at 61-62.

8. Id. at 62.
9. Id. at 63.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 65.
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years." 13 The lesson, they noted, is "that a committed prosecutor can implement the screening/bargaining
tradeoff even without the conscious support of
14
other actors in the system."'
Wright and Miller were careful to note that "[a] prosecutor who shifts to
'5
stronger screening risks more strained relations with the local police."'
They optimistically suggested, however, that at least in theory, "an intense
screening policy should encourage better police work," particularly if the
police insisted on "feedback from the prosecutor's office both during and
after the screening process" and "raise[d] the political cost for recalcitrant
prosecutors
who continue to decline cases that the police give a high
16
priority."'

In March 2002, after twenty-eight years in the post (five terms),
Connick announced that he would not seek reelection. 17 His successor,
Eddie Jordan, took office in January 200318 and soon commissioned an
"Operations and Needs Assessment" that was conducted by national
consulting firm Linder & Associates under the auspices of the New Orleans
Police Foundation.' 9 The consulting team was led by Paul Shechtman, a
former Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of New York.20 The team's report is a portrait of an
utterly dysfunctional system, with the District Attorney's office at least acquiescing in and perhaps contributing to this dysfunctionality. 2'
The consultants' report noted the lack of coordination between the
D.A.'s office and the police 22 and bluntly set out the consequences of unilateral action. The conviction rate for cases actually pursued hovered between

13. Id. at 117.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 97.
16. Id. at 97-98.
17. Gwen Filosa, Court Is Adjourned: New Orleans' Longtime and Controversial DA Harry
Connick Says He Has No Regrets and Looks Forwardto His Family Time and His Singing Career,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 10, 2003, at Al.
18. Id.
19. EDDIE J. JORDAN, JR., TOWARD A FULLY INTEGRATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4-5

(2005), available at https://secure.cityofno.com/resources/portal 102/DaComstat.pdf.
20. Id.at 5.
21. See id. at 109 (stating that assistant district attorneys and New Orleans police officers "do
not believe that either group 'knows what they are doing"'); id. at 117 (finding that assistant district
attorneys "expressed confusion over the current mission of the DA's Office"); id. at 118 (indicating
that communication within the D.A.'s office is "poor").
22. Id. at 7 (noting the lack of collaboration between the D.A.'s office and the New Orleans
Police Department in addressing "the issue that many arrests are not prosecutable"). A 2005 report
by the Metropolitan Crime Commission in New Orleans noted: "The negative impact of the lack of
integration between the NOPD and D.A.'s Office is nowhere more apparent than in the case
screening process ....The current system was put in place in the 1980's and little has changed
since then."

METRO. CRIME COMM'N OF NEW ORLEANS, PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ORLEANS

CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
2003-2004,
at
20
(2005),
available
http://metrocrimeno.org/2Perf of theNOCriminalJusticeSystem_2003-20041.pdf.

at

2006]

Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform

2059

89.9% and 96.6% between 2002 and 200423 and, of the defendants who
pleaded guilty, between 82.2% and 94.8% pleaded as charged. 4 But only
40.3% of the Part I (FBI index) crime cases presented by the police were accepted for prosecution in 2002 and only 38.2% in 2004.25 It is difficult to put
these acceptance rates in a precise comparative perspective.2 6 But in
California, in 2004, 60.7% of violent felony arrests and 76.4% of property
arrests ended in convictions (not simply acceptances), with a 69.8% figure
for all felony arrests.27 While one cannot easily quantify the point, the New
Orleans acceptance rates were extraordinarily low.
The New Orleans police evidently were not responding to rigorous
prosecutorial screening by bringing stronger cases. They were just continuing to bring weak ones and willing to suffer a refusal to prosecute. The lack
of coordination between New Orleans' police and prosecutors was surely not
the city's only criminal justice problem before Hurricane Katrina, and the
structure and operations of the city's criminal justice institutions will likely
be different after it. 28 Yet the episode offers a powerful reminder that transcends both the city's idiosyncratic approach to criminal justice and the
rationale behind D.A. Connick's demand for more rigorous screening: for
better or worse, the police are critical actors in the sentencing process.

23. JORDAN, supra note 19, at 16.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 12; see Amanda Ripley, What Happenedto the Gangs of New Orleans?, TIME, May
at
available
60,
at
54,
2006,
22,
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1194016,00.html (noting that "in New Orleans,
93% of people arrested from 2003 to 2004 never went to prison").
26. The Department of Justice reports that in forty counties representative of the nation's
seventy-five most populous counties, 68% of all felony arrests ended in conviction; this figure
consists of a 60% conviction rate for all violent felony arrests and a 72% conviction rate for all
felony property arrests. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 24 tbl.23 (2006), available at
Discerning screening rates in the reporting
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf.
jurisdictions is a challenge, however. In some counties, prosecutors report screened-out cases as
"dismissals." Id. at 39. In other counties, prosecutors review felony arrests before deciding
whether to file felony charges, but if prosecutors choose not to file charges, then the cases are not
reported at all. Id.
27. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2004,
at 69 (2004), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd04iDispositions.pdf. In New
York, the overall conviction rate for arrests in 2001 was 57.5% for New York City and 64.2% for
New York State. STATISTICAL SERVS. UNIT, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS.,
2000-2001 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT § 3, at 5 (2004), available at
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja 00_01/sec3.pdf.
28. See Dan Baum, Deluged: When Katrina Hit, Where Were the Police?, NEW YORKER, Jan.
9, 2006, at 50, 52 ("As an institution.., the New Orleans Police Department disintegrated with the
first drop of floodwater."); Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Crime Swept Away, with Most of the
People, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at A18 (noting that New Orleans' murder rate, which was
formerly the highest in the nation, plummeted to zero following Hurricane Katrina); Ripley, supra
note 25, at 55 (noting that "New Orleans was a disaster site before Katrina").
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Once one sees a casefile not as a given but as an artifact of a factgathering process that is primarily dominated by the police and that
incorporates prosecutorialdecision-making only to the extent that some
political or bureaucratic mechanism mediates between the two coordinate
entities, one sees the limitations of a sentencing literature that focuses on the
results of the plea bargaining or formal adjudicative process. Before we get
too caught up in sentencing differentials across the defendants who are actually prosecuted, we ought to give some thought to the defendants who get
away because investigative or adjudicative resources are not expended on
them. And, of course, it is also helpful to get all murderers off the streets.
Without pointing fingers at D.A. Connick-who after all may have been
making the best of a bad situation-one can use the breakdown in relations
between his office and the New Orleans Police Department to raise some
larger questions. Where prosecutors and police have independent sources of
authority and stand in a coordinate, not hierarchical relationship, what
mechanisms ensure that each agency internalizes, or at least strongly considers the policies and preferences of the other? One might model the
relationship as a bilateral monopoly and assume that some degree of negotiation occurs between the two parties necessary to the prosecution of a criminal
case. 29 The validity of this assumption, however, turns on the degree to
which the two are trying to maximize their joint output, or to which each is
judged by a performance measure that implicates the other.
One could imagine an administrative mechanism that would prevent a
prosecutor's office from shifting costs to the police (for however laudable a
reason), prevent the police from shifting its costs back to the public (in the
form of unprosecuted offenders), or both. In the federal system, the Attorney
General-who, along with the Deputy Attorney General, has hierarchical
authority over federal prosecutions and those enforcement agencies housed in
the Justice Department-at least potentially plays this role. 30 State systems,
on the other hand, generally lack even this small degree of structural
coordination, because police chiefs report to mayors and because district
attorneys are directly elected. The degree to which alternative mechanisms
will develop is ultimately a matter of politics.
Bill Stuntz and I have argued that electoral accountability can play an
important role in ensuring the health of state systems-at least in comparison
to the federal system-since voters can easily grasp and track the
prosecutions of murders, rapes, and robberies that are staples of those

29. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 758 (2003).
30. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Predictive Factors,41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1439, 1440 (2004) (describing the
Department of Justice as a unified agency under control of the Attorney General but noting that in
reality "such is not always the case"); Richman, supra note 29, at 756 (noting that only the Attorney
General and Deputy Attorney General have hierarchical authority over both the prosecutors and
investigative agencies within the Justice Department).
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systems.3 1 In 2003, for example, the D.A. in San Francisco, Terence
Hallinan, also found himself at loggerheads with the police. Shortly before
the 2003 election, the most recent data (from 2001) showed his office declining to file charges in 36.7% of all felony arrests (compared to a statewide
figure of 13.6%) 32-a rate Hallinan attributed to sloppy police work. 33 Just
29% of all adult felony arrests in 2001 ended in convictions.34 Hallinan lost
the election to an opponent who made much of Hallinan's alleged incompetence and low conviction rate.3 5 Indeed, two political scientists, Sanford C.
Gordon and Gregory A. Huber, have recently gone so far as to predict that
"voters will always reward prosecutors [electorally] for obtaining convictions
and punish them for acquittals. This strategy holds irrespective of either how
tough on crime voters want prosecutors to be, or how much information voters have about individual cases.

36

But political accountability will not always do the trick--either because
so many elections are largely uncontested or because of deeper democratic
failures. The New Orleans report noted that although the city had the highest
homicide rate among the nation's seventy-one largest cities in 2002 and
2003, 37 the vast majority of homicides reported and screened in those years
did not end in convictions. 38 Indeed, in 2002, only 14.3% of the 258 homicides reported and only 15.0% of the homicide cases screened ended in
conviction. 39 Why was this tolerated? Perhaps the rule is that (1) prosecutors are more likely to be held politically accountable than the police where
there is a dysfunctional relationship between the two agencies-which would
make sense, given that police chiefs are politically accountable only through
elected mayors, and mayors have responsibilities (and sources of popularity)
that go far beyond the criminal justice system; and (2) prosecutors will not
always be held so responsible, either because they are held blameless or
because of some larger failure of electoral accountability.

31. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of PretextualProsecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 604-05 (2005).
32. Bill Wallace, San FranciscoRanks Last in Convictions; State Figures Show Relatively Low
RateforDA. 's Office, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2003, at Al.
33. Id.
34. Conflicts between San Francisco's police and D.A.'s office were somewhat exacerbated by
the obstruction of justice investigation that Hallinan pursued against the police department's
leadership. Id.
35. Demian Bulwa, Harris Defeats Hallinan After Bitter Campaign, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10,
2003, at A1; Maura Dolan, New D.A. Beat Incumbent While Embracing Positions,L.A. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2003, at B1.
36. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of
CriminalProsecutors,46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 350 (2002).
37. JORDAN, supra note 19, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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At any rate, the New Orleans program ought to be taken as an object
lesson in the pitfalls of unilateral regulation of prosecutorial bargaining
discretion.
II.

Executive Regulation from Outside the District

For all its perverse systemic effects, the New Orleans D.A.'s screening
initiative was a success story as an experiment in the regulation of line
prosecutors from within their district.40 This is not particularly surprising.
Using a centralized intake mechanism and essentially freezing the valuation
of every case that is allowed to go forward may not serve the interests of
sentencing equity, broadly defined, but it will promote the internal management of the sentencing process within a prosecuting office. Managing the
process from outside the office, however, can pose very different (even
insurmountable) challenges.
Perhaps the best evidence of how difficult it is for a prosecutorial
hierarch to manage the process from beyond the district level comes from the
story of Alaska's plea-bargaining ban. Because of its late start, Alaska has
perhaps the most centralized prosecutorial organization of all fifty states. 4 1
The Governor appoints the attorney general, who in turn appoints and maintains authority over all district attorneys and assistant district attorneys. 42 In
1975, Attorney General Avrum Gross famously announced a ban on pleabargaining that, like D.A. Connick's initiative in New Orleans, relied on
heightened screening standards at intake and severe limitations on plea dispositions thereafter.43
From the start, however, "[t]he ban was not
implemented uniformly throughout the state," with "'local legal culture'
shap[ing] the contours of the policy in each area.",44 And its bite diminished
over time as successor attorneys general gave more discretion to local district
attorneys.45 Indeed, by 2003, complaints from line prosecutors in Alaska
were less about centralization and more about the lack of sufficient policy
guidance from above.46
There are obviously many unique aspects to the Alaska experiment
(beginning with its geographic setting), but it raises a more general issue: To

40. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (explaining the screening initiative's success
in reducing plea bargains).
41. TERESA WHITE CARNS ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS:

1999,
at
34
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/Final%20Version%20of20Report9.pdf.
42. Id. at 34 n.43.
43. Teresa White Cams & John Kruse, A Re-Evaluation of Alaska's Plea BargainingBan, 8
ALASKA L. REv. 27, 33-34 (1991); Wright & Miller, supra note 6, at 44.
44. Cams & Kruse, supra note 43, at 34.
45. Id. at 35.
46. CONFERENCE OF W. ATT'Ys GEN., REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ALASKA

DEPARTMENT
OF
LAW
22
(2003),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdfadmin/FINALCWAGReport.pdf.

available

at
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what extent can a statewide prosecutorial hierarch get a handle on, let alone
control, the way line prosecutors present cases to sentencing judges? Or put
more provocatively: To what extent can such a hierarch do this without the
assistance of sentencing judges? It may sound strange to think of judges as
handmaidens of an executive agenda, but the issue is raised by recent
developments-nicely highlighted in two pieces by Ron Wright47-in New
Jersey, one of the few states that comes close to Alaska in the extent it gives
the attorney general hierarchical control over the state's entire corps of
prosecutors.
Wright tells how, in response to an increase in mandatory minimum
statutes that it (understandably) 48 saw as increasing the risk of prosecutorial
manipulation of sentencing outcomes, the New Jersey Supreme Court
interpreted these statutes "to require the attorney general to draft statewide
charging guidelines. ' 49 It also specified that the attorney general, not the
prosecuting attorneys for each county, keep effective control of these
guidelines. 50 The attorney general responded by promulgating just such
guidelines for the covered offenses (mostly in the narcotics area), 51 and the
court has worked hard to ensure compliance. 52 Under the new guidelines
regime, prosecutors had to explain to trial judges precisely why they were
invoking or not invoking enhanced sentencing provisions.53 The trial judges
"reviewed these reasons to assure that the prosecutors were following the
guidelines. 54
The New Jersey Supreme Court's readiness to take a laboring oar in
institutional reform ("activism" is such a loaded term) might be a sufficient
explanation for the implementation of this scheme. But one might still wonder whether it is merely a coincidence that this judicial initiative occurred
and has flourished in a state in which county prosecutors are not elected but,
like the attorney general, appointed by the Governor with senate
confirmation.5 5 Did the New Jersey court commandeer the attorney general

47. Ronald F. Wright, ProsecutorialGuidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, ProsecutorialGuidelines]; Ronald F. Wright,
Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of ProsecutorialSelf-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1010, 1014 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, Sentencing Commissions].
48. For an effort to model prosecutorial manipulation of mandatory sentencing regimes, see
David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion Under
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591 (2005).
49. Wright, ProsecutorialGuidelines, supranote 47, at 1088.
50. Id. at 1095 (discussing State v. Gems, 678 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996)).
51. For the most recent version of the guidelines, see OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., STATE OF
at
available
(2004),
2
GUIDELINES
BRIMAGE
N.J.,
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/brimage-all.pdf.
52. Wright, Sentencing Commissions, supra note 47, at 1031.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-1 (West 1985).
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to serve its (ostensibly the statute's) purposes? Did the attorney general
readily enlist in an effort that served his own institutional goal of limiting the
discretion of line prosecutors? These seem like questions worth pursuing,
particularly since Wright points out that after promulgating the judicially
mandated guidelines, the New Jersey
attorney general created guidelines in
6
other areas on his own initiative.
Noting how the "lack of monitoring or enforcement by other actors"
reduces the value of internal prosecutorial guidelines "as a way to achieve
consistency and accountability," Wright suggests that "[t]ogether, the
sentencing actors in New Jersey may be creating a partnership that could
thrive in many places. '57 Yet Wright might be under-estimating the role
played by New Jersey's unusual hierarchical structure. The "partnership" in
New Jersey is not between prosecutors and judges generally but between the
judiciary and an attorney general who, but for the guidelines and their judicial enforcement, would be hard-pressed to regulate how his scattered
minions use sentencing concessions. Elsewhere, an attorney general would
not, and would not be expected to, consider local prosecutors as his
minions. 8
Among states, Alaska and New Jersey are outliers when it comes to the
interaction of hierarchical prosecutorial authority and sentencing schemes. 59
They are among the few states whose prosecutorial regime offers at least a
clear structural possibility of direct control and perhaps therefore a degree of
political accountability in this regard.60
In other states, the political
independence of district offices appears to be a conversation-stopper. Even
where statewide elected officials champion mandatory sentencing
measures-with California's three-strikes statute being a particularly famous
example-they leave ample room for district variance, or at least stand ready
to acquiesce in it. 6 1 A ten-year retrospective study of the California law by
the state's District Attorneys Association cited data from the state's most
populous counties indicating that prosecutors exercised their discretion to ask

56. Wright, Sentencing Commissions, supra note 47, at 1034.
57. Id. at 1035-36.
58. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 750 (1996) (noting that in only Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island does the state attorney general have some kind of "supervisory control over local
prosecutorial decisions," including charging).
59. See id. at 732 (noting that in New Jersey prosecutors are "appointed by the governor with
the advice and counsel of the state senate" and in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island,
"local prosecutors are part of the statewide state attorney general's office and are controlled by the
state attorney general").

60. See id.
61. See Joshua E. Bowers, "The Integrity of the Game Is Everything": The Problem of
Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1164, 1167-80 (2001) (analyzing the
geographic disparity in the California Three Strikes law and suggesting that the California
legislature ought to change the law to reflect a principle of proportionality acceptable throughout
California).
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for dismissal of felony strikes in 210/-40% of all three-strikes cases.62
(Having already availed himself of this license and having limited the use of
the statue within his district to violent third-strikes, the Los Angeles district
attorney is now leading a campaign to amend the law and so limit use of the
statute throughout the state.63 ) This pattern has been echoed in other states
with three-strikes legislation. 64
Perhaps this acquiescence stems from a substantial harmony in the
viewpoints of state officials and local prosecutors-who, if anything, may
well be more prone to incarceration than the state officials who have to
actually pay for prisons. 65 Perhaps it reflects acceptance of the independent
political status of prosecutors. Perhaps it reflects a perceived institutional
inability to regulate. Maybe it reflects some combination of these and other
factors. But outside those states with a formal statewide regime, statewide
elected officials have been largely untroubled with what an outsider might
consider district drift but what we take for granted, even celebrate, as local
prosecutorial discretion.6 6
The story has been quite different in the federal system. Here, the existence of a unitary Justice Department (at least on paper) offers the structural

62. CAL. DIST. Arr'Ys ASS'N, PROSECUTORS' PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES
LAW:
A
10-YEAR
RETROSPECTIVE
11
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cdaa.org/WhitePapers/ThreeStrikes.pdf (citing Jennifer Edwards Walsh, Dismissing
Strikes "In Furtherance of Justice": An Analysis of Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Under
California's Three-Strikes Law 9 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
University)).
63. Editorial, Another Strike at "Three Strikes" Law, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2006, at B6; Jill
Leovy, Unlikely Allies Back Three-Strikes Change,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at B 1.
64. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: THE
IMPLEMENTATION
AND
IMPACT
OF
STRIKE
LAWS
8
(2000),
available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/grants/181297.pdf ("[T]he impact [of three-strikes legislation]
has been much less than anticipated, as the courts, and in particular, the prosecutors, have taken
steps to minimize the potential effects of the new laws.").
65. See Misner, supra note 58, at 719-20 (noting the "split-funding" of the criminal justice
system that arises from prosecutors' use of county funds to operate their offices and the use of state
funds to operate prisons, which results in a failure to consider prison resources as a factor when
exercising prosecutorial discretion); see also Barkow, supra note 4, at 806-07 (discussing the trend
of cost-minded state legislatures and politicians to, at times, relax a tough-on-crime stance in favor
of a balanced budget); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1276, 1285-90 (2005) (relating the efforts of many state legislatures to find ways to reduce
prison sentences in order to save money). The Los Angeles D.A.'s campaign to limit the threestrikes law is good evidence, however, that ideology can loom larger than this fiscal dynamic. See
Bowers, supra note 61, at 1177 n.72.
66. Decentralization also means that efforts to cut sentences are best aimed at state legislators
or state legislation, as has occurred in California and Arizona, where voter initiatives focused on
low-level drug possession sentences. See K. JACK RILEY ET AL., RAND CORP., JUST CAUSE OR JUST
BECAUSE?: PROSECUTION AND PLEA BARGAINING RESULTING IN PRISON SENTENCES ON LowLEVEL
DRUG CHARGES
IN CALIFORNIA
AND
ARIZONA
(2005),
available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDMG288.pdf (providing additional information
about the prosecution of imprisoned low-level drug offenders and how such prosecutions might be
affected by diversion reform initiatives such as those in California and Arizona).
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possibility of extra-district regulation. The nature of federal criminal enforcement also brings a far greater risk of policy drift than one finds in state
systems. With no "federal crime rate" to provide an external performance
metric, with a level of resources dwarfed by the range of criminal jurisdiction
allowed by Congress, and with few clear public expectations of how their
caseload should be selected and handled,67 federal prosecutors pose unique
supervisory challenges to distant sentencing hierarchs.
In the federal system, the effort from outside the district to deploy
judges as regulators of prosecutorial charging and bargaining has been quite
clear, albeit ill-fated. This is the story of "relevant conduct." And it is a
story of an attempt that did not just fail, but really back-fired. As Julie
O'Sullivan has explained, the best justification for the modified "realoffense" sentencing approach of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (which
often required sentencing judges to consider criminal conduct alleged in
counts that were dropped as part of a plea deal) is that it endeavored to limit
prosecutor's ability to undercharge or to otherwise understate the seriousness
of a defendant's conduct. 68 To be sure, the approach promised to limit prosecutorial leverage in plea negotiations, but the goal was also to have a
defendant's sentence be based on all "relevant conduct," not just the subset
of it that the line prosecutor chose to identify. 69 That judges would actually
learn about all of a defendant's "relevant conduct" was simply a matter of
faith-faith that was probably misplaced notwithstanding the efforts of probation officers to serve judges in this regard.7 ° As the Sentencing
Commission's Fifteen Year Report makes clear, the extent to which
prosecutors-with the cooperation of defense attorneys-understate offense
conduct as part of a negotiated settlement may be hard to quantify, but it

67. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 31, at 613-15.
68. Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense
System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1359-60 (1997); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison
Meets a Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of FederalSentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235,
244 (2005) ("Even at the individual case level, the relevant conduct rules were designed to ensure
that prosecutors did not manipulate their control of the facts into absolute control over sentencing
outcomes."); David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for RealOffense Sentencing, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1434, 1434-35 (1997) (noting that "the potential
justification for requiring judges to consider alleged criminal conduct for which the defendant has
not been convicted is that it may negate undercharging by prosecutors" but arguing that allegedrelated offense sentencing is a "moral and practical disaster").
As Michael O'Hear recently noted, the House version of the Sentencing Reform Act would have
directed the Justice Department to "'issue guidelines for U.S. Attorneys to use in deciding what
charges to bring and what plea bargains to make,"' and would have authorized judges to reject plea
agreements that did not conform to those guidelines. Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of
Uniformity in FederalSentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 774 n.140 (2006) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 98-1017, at 36 (1984)).
69. O'Sullivan, supra note 68, at 1350-51.
70. Kevin R. Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 LAW & POL'Y
389, 407-08 (1998).
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appears to be quite significant. 7' (It is also entirely possible that judges,
uncomfortable with the severity of guideline sentences, consciously overlooked such factual omissions.) Indeed, as Judge Nancy Gertner has written,
"real offense" sentencing "in fact proved to be a boon for prosecutors rather
72
than a limit on their power.,
Questioning O'Sullivan's justification of real-offense sentencing as a
way to restrain inappropriate prosecutorial leniency, David Yellen suggested
in 1997 that if such leniency really was a problem, the Department of Justice
could find other ways to regulate charging decisions.7 3 Not long thereafter,
in 2003, the Ashcroft Justice Department endeavored to do just that through
the famous "Ashcroft Memorandum." In the wake of congressional efforts
to further limit judicial sentencing discretion under then-mandatory
sentencing guidelines, 74 Attorney General Ashcroft directed that "in all
federal criminal cases, federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of
the case, except as authorized by [designated supervisory officials]" under
certain limited exceptions.75

71. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 82-92

(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15-year/15-year-study-full.pdf (suggesting, based on
surveys of judges and attorneys along with other compiled data, that understating offenses in plea
bargaining is widespread); see also KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 139 (1998) (discussing the extent to which

prosecutors misrepresent or manipulate facts in plea agreements); Nancy King, Judicial Oversight
of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 296-98

(2005) (recognizing the reality of understated offenses as reflecting the compromise and
professional judgment expected in plea negotiations).
72. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569,
577 (2005).

73. Yellen, supra note 68, at 1438.
74. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (Supp. 2004)) (detailing appellate review of sentences given in district
court that depart from the guideline range); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315,

1335-36 (2005)

(commenting on the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act, which instituted a more stringent
review for departures from sentencing guidelines); see also Douglas A. Berman, Locating the
Feeney Amendment in a Broader Sentencing Reform Landscape, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 249 (2004)

(commenting on the Feeney Amendment's impact on the traditional purposes of punishment and the
institutional framework of sentencing and comparing it with other sentencing guideline systems);
O'Hear, supra note 68, at 786-90.
75. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Federal
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm; see
also Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of ProsecutorialPower to

Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 301-02 (2004) (citing Attorney General
Ashcroft's circulation of the Memorandum in compliance with the terms of the Feeney
Amendment); O'Neill, supra note 30, at 1487 (citing Attorney General Ashcroft's call for a return
to former Attorney General Thornburgh's position to "charge the most serious crime supported by
the known facts").
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It is far from clear whether the Ashcroft Memorandum had any effect on
line prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys' offices.7 6 When it came to capital cases,
which have long been given intensive attention at the highest levels," the
Department could indeed preclude lenient dispositions (at least until the case
went to the jury).78 But ordinary cases appear to have been more immune to
this policy intervention. The Sentencing Commission's Fifteen Year Report
found: "While charging and plea bargaining are officially regulated by nationwide DOJ policies, researchers reported that in practice these policies
were less determinative of prosecutorial conduct than internal U.S.
Attorney's office policies. 7 9
The fact that the Department has had so much trouble regulating line
prosecutors does not render its efforts illegitimate. Even one who thinks federal sentencing is generally too high can recognize the interest of politically
responsible officials in implementing an administration's policy preferences
in the trenches. And an administration's concerns are likely to be grounded
as much in institutional perspective as in policy preference.
In their insightful effort to explain why federal drug sentences declined
between 1992 and 1999, Bowman and Heise suggested:
Part of the explanation for the continued downward drift of federal
drug sentences is surely that some of the front-line actors in the federal
criminal system feel passionately that drug sentencing rules are too
harsh. But a far more important consideration may be that a critical
mass of those front-line actors are simply unconvinced of the
imperative to commit the time, institutional resources, and emotional
capital0 necessary to defend strict interpretation of drug sentencing
8
rules.
One factor that might have influenced the way line prosecutors made
these judgments during the 1990s was a growing careerism in U.S.
Attorneys' offices during this period. By Todd Lochner's calculation, "the

76. See G. Jack King Jr., NACDL Survey: USAOs Deny Ashcroft Memo Affecting Plea
Bargaining,CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 6, 6 (finding that there has been little effect in charging and
plea-bargaining policies in the federal system under Attorney General Ashcroft).
77. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Departmentof Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 347, 406-19 (1999) (giving a description of
the Department's review of capital cases); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL

CASE REVIEW (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htn
(reviewing the federal death penalty system).
78. See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697,
1698 (2003) (comparing the different approaches taken under Attorney General Reno and Attorney
General Ashcroft); Richard B. Schmitt, Ashcroft Is Undeterred in Push for Capital Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at Al (noting that "jurors have rebuffed calls for the federal death penalty in
23 of the 34 capital cases tried since 2001").
79. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 71, at 84.
80. Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of
Declining FederalDrug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1133 (2001).
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average tenure time for assistant U.S. attorneys increased from roughly threeand-a-half years in the 1960s to just over eight years" by 1996-1998.81
Lochner noted that these figures reflect the tenures only of people who left
their positions as assistant U.S. attorneys and that it appears that turnover
rates declined from 6% to 2%.82 With this statistical backdrop, Lochner drew
on personal interviews with numerous U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S.
attorneys to conclude:
[T]he growing length of tenure among assistants tends to discourage
compliance with changes in office or department priorities because 1)
assistants know that short of egregious behavior they will "outlive"
both the attorney general and their respective U.S. attorney; 2) their
careerist status has dramatically altered their personal incentive
structures, making them less eager to take complex cases involving
extensive discovery and overtime hours, and more eager to take cases
that can be disposed of quickly and with little effort; and 3) their
longevity as federal prosecutors tends to reinforce their view that they,
rather than the department or the U.S. 83
attorney, are in the best position
to set an office's prosecutorial agenda.
This growing careerism can only accentuate the inherent tension
between line assistants and the political leadership of the Justice Department.
The Department, of course, can be well served by plea-bargaining that results
in efficient use of its investigative and adjudicative resources, and it can obtain such peak efficiency only by relying on the local knowledge of
prosecutors and agents in the field. Yet with such reliance comes the inevitable risk of agency costs and policy drift, which given the extent of federal
enforcement discretion, presents far more of an oversight challenge in the
federal system than it does in the states.84
Hard pressed to implement its controls through administrative
directives, where will the Justice Department turn? Prediction is hard here,
particularly given the varying extents to which different Administrations
have been committed to centralization. There are only a few options: (1)
concede defeat; (2) continue at the present level of regulation, in full

81. Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and ProsecutorialAgenda Setting in United States
Attorneys' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 282-83
(2002). Offices in the largest metropolitan areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, appeared to
be exceptions to the trend. Id. at 285. This is consistent with the finding by Boylan and Long that
assistant U.S. attorney turnover is higher in high-private-salary districts than in low-private-salary
districts. Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of
FederalProsecutors,48 J.L. & EcON. 627, 627 (2005).
82. Lochner, supra note 81, at 282-83.
83. Id. at 288.
84. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 31, at 599-618 (arguing that a small sphere of
responsibility and a large sphere of jurisdiction allow federal prosecutors time and authority to
pursue investigative detours while state prosecutors are constrained by time and politically
mandatory prosecutions).
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knowledge that the program is more for public and congressional
consumption than internal use; (3) increase the extent and rigor of administrative supervision through some combination of direct bureaucratic control
and measures that draw on the monitoring potential of the FBI and other enforcement agencies; or (4) do more, presumably through sentencing
legislation, to recruit judges as monitors. To be sure, this last option may
not be workable. The Sentencing Commission's Fifteen Year Report noted:
Judicial scrutiny of plea agreements, supported by probation officers'
independent presentence investigations, were often inadequate to
control plea bargaining because both judges and probation officers
were heavily dependent on the information provided by the prosecutor
in a given case. In addition, resource limitations and a reluctance to
reject agreements ...made judicial rejection
of plea agreements that
86
undermined the guidelines relatively rare.
Moreover, as the First Circuit recently noted in a refreshingly candid
opinion about fact-bargaining, the "costs of monitoring compliance" with "a
system of mandatory disclosure of all possible information at a plea hearing"
are high and would come with the loss of "many of the efficiencies created
by plea bargaining." 87 The court also worried that such a system would "lead
88
to the blurring of roles" by effectively involving judges in plea-bargaining.
Still, one could imagine legislation bolstering the judicial oversight capability with measures of the sort recently suggested by Nancy King 89 and
significantly restricting the sentencing options available on any given facts.
One can have one's own policy intuitions or preferences about the
extent to which federal judges should have sentencing discretion. The point
here, however, is that any realistic policy proposal ought to take into account
the Justice Department's likely response to it. A world of untrammeled judicial discretion but intensive administrative monitoring of prosecutors by
Washington might ostensibly respect the prestige of the judiciary but at considerable cost to the rest of the system-at least to the extent one values local
discretion in the federal system. 90 It is hard (but not impossible) to imagine
Washington ever regulating line decision-making with any degree of success.
Replicating the intensive supervision of death penalty cases outside the

85. For a proposal to have judges reject plea bargains that result in substantial sentencing
concessions, see Oren Gazal-Ayal, PartialBan on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDoZO L. REV. 2295
(2006).
86. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 71, at 84.
87. United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1,28 (ist Cir. 2005).
88. Id.
89. King, supra note 71, at 304-08.
90. Compare Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L.
REv. 469, 497 (1996) (advocating more centralized control as a means of better internalizing the
costs of federal prosecutorial policies), with Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law;
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 805-10 (1999)
(noting the risks of centralized control).
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capital docket-where the death penalty has been authorized against a total
of 371 defendants since 1988 9 1-would be prohibitively expensive and
politically difficult. 92 But it is certainly possible to imagine Washington
doing much more in this direction. While Congress has traditionally preferred to commit resources to the districts, 93 rather than Washington, there is
enough play in the budget and in existing bureaucratic structures for substantially more monitoring than is the rule today.94
To what extent should one value and promote local discretion in the
federal system? There are no easy answers here. Stephanos Bibas recently
sought to draw some lines: Conceding that "local crime problems, caseloads,
and knowledge vary and require varied responses," he observed,
[o]ur democratically elected representatives have decided to enact
uniform national criminal laws to address national problems and
enforce them with one voice through one agency-the U.S.
Department of Justice. Locales that disagree cannot in effect secede
from federal
criminal law any more than they can secede from the
95
Union.
He concluded that the "justified variation is grounded in tactical decisions
about localized crime problems-particularly, transient crime waves. Unjustified variation, in contrast, stems from value disagreement; from legally
irrelevant factors such as race, ethnicity, sex, and class; or perhaps from
strategic choices, especially concerning enduring crime problems. 96
Even were it easier to distinguish between localized and enduring crime
problems, Bibas's distinction would still be normatively contestable-not
right or wrong, just contestable. After all, the notion of ostensibly uniform
national criminal laws long predates the Justice Department (not created until
1870). 9' And while Congress did decide to create such a central authority
and give it powers over U.S. Attorneys' offices, it has also endeavored
(sometimes) to insulate U.S. Attorneys' offices from domination or at least to

91. DICK BURR ET AL., CAPITAL DEF. NETWORK, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY PROCESS (2006), http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/sharedfiles/docs/Ioverview

_of_feddeathprocess.asp.
92. See Richman, supra note 90, at 806 (arguing that even if Congress favored complete
centralized supervision by Main Justice, it would find "the costs of such supervision prohibitive").

93. See id. at 806-07 (discussing explanations for congressional acquiescence in the
decentralization of prosecution).
94. See id. at 793-98 (discussing examples of Congress exercising control over budgetary and
structural policy for law enforcement agencies).
95. Bibas, supra note 5, at 139-40.

96. Id. at 141.
97. See Adam H. Kurland, First PrinciplesofAmerican Federalismand the Nature Of Federal

CriminalJurisdiction,45 EMORY L.J. 1, 54 (1996) (arguing that "the ratification debates, the debate
over the Bill of Rights and its subsequent enactment, and the federal criminal legislation enacted by
the first few Congresses" demonstrate that "the Constitution allowed for a relatively broad federal
criminal jurisdiction if Congress elected to so provide").
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limit Washington's ability to control those offices. 98 Moreover, to the extent
that Bibas worries that "[v]ariations also make the law seem arbitrary, undercutting its perceived fairness and legitimacy," 99 he underestimates
Americans' tolerance in this regard. There is, after all, considerable variation
in the priorities of district attorneys' offices within a state, notwithstanding
the uniformity of the prevailing penal code. Because each district attorney is
politically accountable to a different electorate, this variation may be more or
less defensible than in the federal system. The point, however, is that the
mere existence of a national set of criminal laws does not, by itself, imply
some optimal allocation of authority between Main Justice and the U.S.
Attorneys' offices.
Against this institutional backdrop, sentencing issues may take on a
different complexion. Once one sees the sentencing process as a means
whereby Main Justice can monitor and constrain the behavior of line
prosecutors, then the hamstringing of judicial discretion so condemned in the
sentencing literature may (to some at least) be more attractive than its
alternatives. If, for example, one values local discretion (because one prefers
the district's approach to the death penalty or drug enforcement to the
Administration's or because one thinks a district's commitment to attacking
fraud or corruption will be greater than that of a particular Administration or
national bureaucracy more generally), one may well prefer that Main Justice
recruit local district judges as monitors rather than engage in more direct bureaucratic intervention. It is quite possible that judicial monitoring, in the
context of a relatively inflexible sentencing regime, would sufficiently address Washington's interest in limiting the discretion of its prosecutors. One
might, under this analysis, embrace a rather inflexible sentencing scheme
patrolled by judges charged with looking beyond bargained results not because it is normatively worthy of celebration but as a second- (or third-) best
alternative.
Do any of these speculations provide a blueprint for reform in the
federal system? I doubt it, but I do think that reformers need to keep them in
mind as the rough cease-fire that we now have courtesy of Booker begins to
break down (a pessimistic but not unrealistic prediction). 100 The last twentyfive years-a time of the largest growth in federal enforcement activity in
history-have been a period of spectacular flux in the allocation of power
between Washington and U.S. Attorneys' offices and in the extent of

98. See Richman, supra note 90, at 805-10 (explaining the benefits of the existing "dispersed
authority" that protects U.S. Attorneys' offices from Washington's complete control).
99. Bibas, supra note 5,at 139.
100. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee. . . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HoUs, L.
REv. 279 (2006) (empirically evaluating the immediate effects of Booker and discussing emerging
trends); Susan R. Klein, The Return of FederalJudicialDiscretion in CriminalSentencing, 39 VAL.
U. L. REv. 693, 732-34 (2005) (predicting that "there will be no meaningful review of sentencing
post-Booker").
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sentencing discretion allowed to federal judges. Conversations about the two
issues tend to stay on separate tracks. Yet although the two issues need not
be linked, they are-at least when it comes to federal prosecutorial
discretion-two different ways of talking about some of the same things.
When it comes to sentencing policy outside the federal context, the
federal experience, particularly when combined with the more equivocal
evidence from Alaska and New Jersey, suggests that more attention should
be paid to the way the existence of, or desire for, prosecutorial centralization
(or the lack thereof) influences sentencing policymaking. 0 1 The suggestion
here, albeit quite tentative, is that a statewide executive authority interested
in promoting or maintaining a degree of control over local prosecutorial
offices will be attracted to sentencing regimes that encourage or require
judges to scrutinize the congruence of plea bargains with case facts or that
mandate other judicial monitoring measures. Of course, there may be countervailing considerations counseling against reliance on judges in this regard,
but a state attorney general (or governor, or legislature acting at the behest of
the attorney general or governor) will have few other options if the goal is
limiting prosecutorial drift. As a general matter, state executive authorities
are the dogs that have not barked very loudly when it comes to the overall
management of the prosecutorial side of state criminal justice systems. That
may well remain the case. But if it changes, the change will likely be seen in
sentencing regimes.
III. Toward New Issues of Intra-District Prosecutorial Control
The dominant pattern in state jurisdictions has statewide officials
seeking-to various extents but always with less zeal than their federal
counterparts-to restrict judicial sentencing discretion, but with little interest
in restricting prosecutorial bargaining positions. They have left these to the
regulation of district authorities who, should they want to do so, have had
recourse to screening and monitoring regimes of the sort deployed by D.A.
Connick in New Orleans, with little need to draft judges to help in the
endeavor. Such monitoring regimes, however, require a considerable degree
of centralized control. And we are in a period in which "community

101. Many statewide policymakers have, for budgetary reasons among others, become
interested in using sentencing law to reduce overall incarceration levels. See Rachel E. Barkow &
Kathleen M. O'Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing
Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 1973, 1986-87 (2006) (empirically
demonstrating that sentencing commissions are likely to be "particularly attractive when fiscal
concerns of incarceration are salient"). This does not mean, however, that they are not also
interested in using sentencing procedures to limit prosecutorial concessions. See id. at 1987-88
(discussing reasons legislatures delegate sentencing authority).
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less

centralized-are

becoming all the rage.

As Catherine Coles noted: "Working closely with citizens who view
their problems locally, by neighborhood, puts pressure on prosecutors to
decentralize their operations. Many prosecutors are exploring how this can
be achieved, even in the realm of screening and prosecuting cases., 10 3 To the
degree that prosecutors do move in this direction, we may well see a new
interest in judicial monitoring and in sentencing regimes that demand such
monitoring on the part of district attorneys. Even flexible sentencing guidelines can promote a D.A. office's "bureaucratic control over its staff of
assistants," as Jeffery Ulmer and John Kramer found in their study of three
offices in Pennsylvania. 104 But with decentralization and the consequent loss
of alternative means of bureaucratic control, D.A. offices might become
much more interested in less flexible sentencing regimes and even in judicial
monitoring. This is very much a story in progress.
IV. Conclusion
Even as we try to determine the best allocation of power between judges
and prosecutors in the sentencing process, we should not forget that
prosecutorial interests are not monolithic and that for prosecutorial hierarchs,
sentencing judges are as much potential monitoring partners as they are
potential rivals. Whether judges will be enlisted (or, as in New Jersey, will
volunteer) in this monitoring project will vary by jurisdiction and by the degree of prosecutorial centralization within the jurisdiction. Those who would
engage prosecutorial policy-makers in a sentencing reform project should at
least be aware of this, and perhaps can even make use of it.

102. See JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY PROSECUTION
STRATEGIES 10 n.3 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/bja/195062.pdf (noting that
the American Prosecutors Research Institute "estimates that 80 sites in the United States are
operating some type of community prosecution program"); M. ELAINE NUGENT ET AL., AM.
PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION: COMMUNITY
PROSECUTION vs. TRADITIONAL PROSECUTION APPROACHES 18 (2004), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/changing-nature-of-prosecution.pdf
(suggesting
that
community
prosecutors put more emphasis than traditional prosecutors on preventing crime and on making
victims feel safe); Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1152
(2005) (remarking that district attorneys use decentralized prosecution efforts to strengthen their
connection to the community); Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Prosecution in the
Community:
A
Study
of
Emergent
Strategies
35
(Sept.
1998),
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/cross-site.pdf (noting how partnerships
with citizen groups push prosecutors to decentralize their operations).
103. Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution,Problem Solving, andPublic Accountability:
The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 23 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard
Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
00-02-04,
2000),
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/community-prosecution.pdf.
104. Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use and Transformation of Formal DecisionMaking Criteria:Sentencing Guidelines, OrganizationalContexts, and Case-ProcessingStrategies,
45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 264 (1998).

